Cyberint's threat intelligence platform: one flow for every threat indicator, beyond the perimeter.
Data visualizationCyberSaaSThreat IntelligenceJun 2016 – Jan 2017
2016as shipped
Designed nine years ago, and it looks it: deliberately left as
it shipped. Still in production today under Check Point:
see it now →
5Roles mapped
3Organizational contexts
7Functional requirement areas
2024Acquired by Check Point
Still in production a decade on: see Impact
Goal
Give customers cyber protection that goes beyond the perimeter: letting analysts find,
map and study threats using a growing set of collected indicators.
The challenge
Analysts across three different organizational contexts (end customers, MSSPs, and
Cyberint's own SOC) needed one shared investigation workflow, with no existing shared
vocabulary, prioritization logic, or way to trace how indicators connected to one
another.
My role
UX research & concept design: visual UI execution by
Cyberint's in-house UI team
Three contexts, the same investigation, and a different amount of
the system each is allowed to configure.
Argos needed to serve the same core workflow across three organizational
setups: end customer, Cyberint's own SOC, and MSSP/SOC partners. I mapped five roles
across them (Analyst, Operational Manager, Risk Manager, Third Party Operator and
CISO) profiling each by frequency of use, task importance, and cost of a mistake.
The gradient below is the part that shaped the build: end customers would
get some configuration in a later version, MSSP partners additional, and
Cyberint's own SOC all of it. One interface had to hold all three without
feeling stripped for the first or cluttered for the last.
End customer
The organisation being protected
Some configuration next version
Analyst
Works through indicators to identify threats to their own organisation.
Operational manager
Manages the analyst team and QAs their performance and output. KPI
oriented.
MSSP / SOC
A partner defending someone else's estate
Additional configuration
Analyst
Works through indicators to identify threats for external customers.
Operational manager
Team management, new customer domain specification, QA, and
cross-customer analysis.
Cyberint SOC
In-house super users
Full configuration
Analyst
Same investigation work for external customers, with every setting
available.
Operational manager
Team management, new customer domain specification, QA, and cross-customer
analysis.
Shared characteristics
Technical expertise: medium to high.
English essential, a second language an advantage.
Deep understanding of the cyber world and/or intelligence work.
Strong online orientation and high data-analysis capability.
A development background is a plus for Cyberint SOC and MSSP analysts.
Managers additionally need people-management skill, which is why the
manager views are read-mostly.
Working environment
SOC analysts work across multiple client environments at once, and every
role searches outside the system as part of an investigation, so Argos could
never assume it was the only window open.
Incidents leave through an external ticketing system or email, which is
where the end customer receives them.
Some analysts work on two machines (one on the internal server, one on an
external network), so nothing could depend on a single continuous session.
User interviews · 3 participants
02. Terminology & system goals
A shared vocabulary had to exist before a shared screen could.
Before any UI work began, I defined the system's core terms: Indicator, a potential threat found through open-source keyword search, and
Online Asset, the customer properties to protect: websites, IPs, social channels,
DNS. Every later design decision was anchored to that common language.
Indicator
A potential threat surfaced by open-source keyword search. The unit everything
else in the system hangs off.
Online asset
A customer property worth protecting: a website, an IP, a social channel, a DNS
record.
Threat actor
The person or group behind an indicator, tracked across sightings rather than
per incident.
Paste site
A text-sharing site where leaked credentials surface, and one of the sources
indicators are found on.
Linkage
A traced relationship between two entities. The reason the detail view needed a
graph and not a list.
De-duplication
Collapsing repeat sightings of one indicator into a single row, so volume never
reads as spread.
Entity
Anything the system can hold and relate: an asset, an actor, a campaign, a
sector.
Investigation & incident
An investigation is the work of examining an indicator. An
incident is what gets escalated, ticketed and sent on.
Vocabulary agreed with Cyberint's SOC, product and R&D before any UI
work began. Who the users are (end customer, MSSP, in-house SOC) is set out in 01.
03. Functional & UI requirements
Functional pillars, mapped directly from analyst tasks.
I documented seven functional requirement areas, from processing incoming
indicators to managing the cyber knowledge base and tracking team KPIs, plus UI
requirements covering visualization, fast data entry and multi-customer management.
04. Investigation methodology · 5W
A “what / who” framework for every investigation.
I mapped the investigation flow onto a 5W model: what identifies the
attack type and target (region, sector, product, vulnerability), and who
identifies the attacker or attackers, and any connections between multiple actors.
What discovery told us
Users span three organizational contexts with different permission needs.
No shared vocabulary existed before this project.
Every action needed a frequency, importance and mistake-cost profile.
What made it hard
Serving three org structures through one interface.
No existing model for indicator-to-indicator relationships.
A minimum spec of 1920 × 1080 on a 24-inch display, no smaller.
Design
Flow, screen, and 6 decisions
Reading this in 2016
This shipped nine years ago, and it looks it. That is worth stating plainly rather
than leaving a reader to wonder, because most of what dates the screens was the
right call at the time:
Sketch and InVision: Figma would not launch publicly for another
sixteen months, so there were no components shared across a team and no
prototyping outside a click-through.
No design system to inherit. Cyberint had no component library, so
controls were drawn per screen. Consistency was maintained by hand.
1280px, on Windows. Analysts worked in IE11 on wide, short displays,
which is why the grid is dense and the whitespace is scarce; a SOC analyst is
paid to see more rows, not fewer.
What I would change now: the density is defensible, but the visual hierarchy
leans on borders where it should lean on space and weight, and the filter panel
would be a progressive disclosure rather than a wall of fields. The
investigation logic underneath it is the part that held: see Impact.
Investigation flow
From a received indicator to a closed incident, or a deleted one.
Every branch an analyst can take, mapped before any screen was drawn:
triage the indicator, investigate it with consultation, the knowledge base and
mark-for-later to hand, then either raise an incident and coordinate through to
resolution, or stop.
The platform, as designed
One screen holding the grid, the text, and the relationships between
entities.
Solutions
Area 01. Grid
Decision: summarized info as the “master” list
The grid shows condensed, scannable information across all indicators, so an analyst
can move fast between threats before committing to one. It's the master in a
master–detail layout: every other panel updates from what's selected here.
Area 02. Indicator: text & analysis
Decision: three levels of interaction, matched to intent
This area combines a relationship graph, a timeline, and the full text and analysis of
the selected indicator. Interaction depth scales with intent: hover to scan without
committing, click to surface connections, open to enter that entity's own page. That
let analysts explore broadly or drill in, without the UI forcing one mode.
Area 03. Navigation: folders & tabs
Decision: folders for organization, tabs for parallel work
Folders let analysts organize indicators into working sets; tabs let them keep
multiple investigations open side by side without losing context on any one of them.
Area 04. Filter system
Decision: simple by default, boolean and savable on demand
A flexible filter system supports complex boolean queries, with the option to save a
query for reuse. The advanced panel pins open and pushes the grid down rather than
overlaying it: keeping daily filtering fast while giving power users full control when
they need it. It's the same trade-off I'm solving again today in a bulk-actions filter
system, this time looking at Linear, Datadog and Retool.
Area 05. Profile card
Decision: a dedicated surface for entity enrichment
Each entity (threat actor, asset, indicator) got its own profile card, surfacing
additional context and letting analysts manually enrich it with new information as they
investigated.
Area 06. Gamification dashboard
Decision: cut, not shipped
A gamified dashboard was designed to encourage analysts to manually enrich data,
compensating for technical limitations in automatic enrichment at the time. It was cut
from scope before launch: a deliberate trade-off given the platform's technical
constraints at that stage.
Impact · 10 years later
A concept that outlived its own deck.
A decade after this project, the platform I helped conceive is the foundation
of what Check Point now offers as part of its threat-management suite, following
Check Point's 2024 acquisition of Cyberint into its Infinity Platform. It's still
being developed today, and its current UI carries forward the same investigation logic
mapped here: a Threat Actor Heat-Map echoing the original link-analysis diagram, and
a filterable News Bulletin echoing the original grid-and-filter structure.
2016: the grid, the detail and the relationship graph, as designed.Today: the heat-map and filterable bulletin carrying forward the original
structure.